

The Birth of BELIEF (Kepercayaan): The Struggle of the Minority Religions in Indonesia

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**The Birth of Belief (Kepercayaan) : The Struggle of the Minority Religions in Indonesia.**

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Anthropologists nowadays have begun to direct more attention to the inventiveness of what they have conventionally called 'culture' 'tradition' or 'religion'. Recent buzzphrases like 'the invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), demonstrate our critical consciousness about the intricate historical factors which operate behind the timeless façade of these notions. Such 'inventionistic' approach, somewhat in vogue recently, is not confined to 'tradition', however. Wagner, for instance, stresses the invention of culture through the process of anthropological inquiry itself (Wagner 1975). Aside from such invention-by-anthropologists type of argument, ranging from accusatory analysis of the colonial past of anthropology (Leclerc 1972) to the sophisticated self-reflection on the 'construction of the other' (Fabian 1983; Thomas 1989), by way of ever so fashionable Foucauldian anti-'Orientalism' (Said 1978), there is another line of argument which emphasises more on the historical and political factors, in parallel with the growing concern among anthropologists in regards to the role of nationalism and the modern state for the construction of these notions, stimulated by such studies as Anderson's (1983). Thus, for instance, Hoskins writes about the invention of the new national 'heroes' in Indonesia, of which one of the main political purposes is to create a new legitimate national history as a visible story of the nation's struggle against colonialism (Hoskins 1987).

In this sense, any cultural research attempted in the contemporary modern nation state cannot avoid the question of the state, because the state does not only endeavour to keep its territorial boundary by force, but is also obliged to build up a number of symbolic devices to sustain its unity in the face of ethnic diversity and possible symbolic disintegration.

Hence to talk about 'religion' which is the main focus of this paper, an understanding of its relationship with state in the process of nation building is of essential importance. Although it is tempting to conclude that a state utilises religion as one of the most effective symbolic tools with which to integrate the whole country, the reality is not as simple as this. The complexity arises when it is accepted that the clear-cut boundary of the concept of 'religion' is but academic as well as political artifact, and that such invention of 'religion' itself can be the very focus of political

manipulation. This also signifies that the number of the officially recognised religions varies according to how a state defines it. Such political manipulation is most visible when a state tries to mobilise the populace under the banner of state religion. In the time of rapid modernisation in ethnically highly homogenous countries like Japan, or to a lesser degree Thailand, the governments adopted policies to promote the majority creed, Shintoism in Japan and Theravada Buddhism in Thailand as de facto state religions. In Japan, a state shinto shrine was built and the collective cult of the emperor as a living god was established during war time (Murakami 1986), while in Thailand, the king Rama 6 Vajiravudh created a national ideology which underscored the unity of Nation, Buddhism, and King as the core element of Thai nationalism (Wyatt 1982: p.229; Vella 1978), and in the earlier constitution the word sasana (religion) automatically meant Theravada Buddhism (Reynolds 1978, p.136).

Such policy, however, is implimentable only when the majority ethnic or religious group has paramount dominance over the minority groups. Even in Japan, minority Christian groups, approximately 0.6% of the population, are highly critical of the remnants of the pre-war collective shinto cult (Iimura 1991). In Thailand, the Muslim minority in the south launched a secession movement which often involved terrorism, and the central government finally adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards them, though the emphasis of Theravada Buddhism as the pillar of the nation has not been much altered ( Dulyakasem 1984; Farouk 1984; Pitsuwan 1985,1988).

What happens, then, to the relationship between state and religion if a country is far more diverse in ethnicity and culture? Indonesia in Southeast Asia is a superb example of such ethno-religious diversity, and the interaction between state and religion is far more complicated than those I have already mentioned.

I will now trace the historic development of the interaction between these three factors in Indonesia, i.e., the state, the dominant religion, and minority religious practices. I pick up two minority religions, namely Hinduism in Bali and kebatinan (Javanese mysticism) in Java to show their historical trajectories in post-Independence era. The state gradually developed a peculiar definition of 'religion' ( agama) and 'belief' ( kepercayaan) through the interaction with Islam, the dominant religion, which further made a great impact on both minority religions. But as Balinese Hinduism succeeded in being transformed into one of the state religions, the Javanese kebatinan was given a very odd category, namely 'belief', which reflects the complexity of interaction between state and religion. I will also show how this new category has affected, through administration, mass media and education, the doctrinal and practical

aspects of the activities of the kebatinan followers, particularly those of spirit cult, in Java.

Statistically speaking, about 85% of the Indonesian population claim to be Muslims, and this figure certainly gives an impression of Islamic dominance in Indonesia. But the religious reality is far from this, and confusion arises as a result of the gap between the statistics and the reality. In such ethnic groups as the Achenese and the Minangkabau in Sumatra and the Banjarese in Kalimantan, for instance, allegiance to Islam is undeniable, but in case of the Javanese, the most populous, hence the politically most dominant ethnic group in Indonesia, things are far more complicated.

Javanese religious history is marked by its gradual shift from the Hindu-Buddhistic period to Islam from around 14 century. After the fall of Majapahit in east Java around 1478, the political center moved to the northern coastal areas where small Muslim states competed with each other, finally the Mataram Kingdom in south central Java attained hegemony over the major part of Java. But this development was paralleled with Dutch colonial expansion, and after several fissions and internecine war among royal families in which the Dutch shrewdly intervened, the Mataram kingdom was confined to a small part of south central Java (Ricklefs 1981). The Dutch gradually transformed the traditional aristocrats called priyayi into the part of their bureaucratic apparatus (Sutherland 1979), and also consciously segregated them from the on-going Islamisation in rural areas (Dhofier 1982). The salient Islamophobia of the Dutch encouraged the development of the distinct aristocratic tradition of the elaborated manner, exquisite art form, and mystic tradition, the basis of kebatinan.

This peculiar polarisation of Javanese religious tradition gave rise to various responses in the Indonesian nationalist movement. Some of the leading Muslims insisted that the coming Indonesia should be based on Islam because the majority of the Indonesian population were Muslims. Secular nationalists and Christians were opposed to this and insisted on a completely secular state. This tug-of-war between the two factions resulted in a peculiarly Indonesian solution, i.e., the five principle of the state, called Pancasila, which consists of the following five principles:

1. KeTuhanan yang Maha Esa Belief in One Supreme God.
2. Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab. Humanitarianism which is just and civilised.
3. Persatuan Indonesia the Unity of Indonesia.
4. Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam Democracy conducted with wisdom, in consultation and representation.

permusyawaratan/perwakilan

5. Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia

Social justice for all the people of Indonesia

Here you can clearly see the eclectic character of these articles. But what attracts attention in view of religious connotation is that article one, i.e., the belief in one Supreme God. The Muslim leaders insisted that the words One Supreme God should be replaced by the word Allah, but this was refused by the majority of nationalists(1).

However, the newly-born government created a ministry of religion, which was virtually monopolised by (conservative) Muslims. Thus at state level, a peculiar compromise was reached between a desire for an Islamic state and secularism, represented by article one of Pancasila and the Islam-oriented Ministry of Religion. Islam's power was shrewdly confined to the domain of religion, but there they procured an official means to implement their religious policy(Noer 1978).

Clifford Geertz found a polarisation of religious trend in Java in 1952-54 just before the first general election(Geertz 1960). Dozens of political parties mushroomed, but the result was a victory for four large parties, the Nationalist party, the Communist party, and two Muslim parties of Masyumi, and Nahdlatul Ulama. What surprised the Muslim leaders was that the Muslim parties could not attain a majority: especially in Java, the former two secular parties dominated in various places. This religious polarisation became quite manifest, between orthodox Muslims and nominal Muslims even in all level of society.

Let us now consider the national religious policy and its impact on minority religions. The establishment of the Ministry of Religion had a gradual, but steady impact on the religious life of Indonesia. The early administrative structure clearly shows the paramount dominance of sections related to Islamic administration, while the Christians, divided into the Catholics and the Protestants, were given only one section each. Thus at the beginning, the Ministry of Religion recognised only two religions and at first paid no attention to the others found in Indonesia(Noer 1978, p.20).

The religious system in Bali is based on the extremely developed system of temples and ritual cycles, a long-standing tourist attraction. The impact of Dutch colonisation was somewhat limited as compared to Java, and it was only after 1908 that the Dutch local Government in Bali really gained a firm grip on the island(Boon 1977, p.30; Anandakusuma 1979, p.37). So in contrast with Java, where in 20th century a number of Islamic reformist movements were launched(2), this traditional system remained comparatively untouched until Indonesian

Independence(Swellengrebel 1960,p.30; Geertz 1973, pp.181-182; 1980, pp.8-9), with the exception of a limited attempt by intellectuals to modernise it.

After Indonesian Independence,the Balinese leaders realised that they had been left in a very awkward position under the newly established Ministry of Religion. In 1952, the first minister of religion decided to designate all religions other than Islam and Christianity section H. This section was formed to deal with any sects whose religious identity was questionable. The local government of Bali took a countermeasure to establish the Autonomous Religious Office(Kantor Agama Otonoom), and various attempts were made to formulate 'Balinese religion' officially (Howell 1977, pp.151-152).

It is around this time that C. Geertz came to Bali and found a very interesting phenomenon. He insists that traditionally the main concern of the Balinese was to perform rituals properly, not to elaborate doctrinal exegesis. He calls such propensity 'orthopraxis' in contrast to orthodoxy. He observed, however, that this characteristic was gradually substituted by a newly awakening consciousness of the doctrine itself. He describes argument in a village concerning the true nature of the deity of one of the temples there, which struck him as something very novel(Geertz 1973).

Behind such newly emerging religious self-consciousness, he saw the impact of the Ministry of Religion. In 1950, a mission of the ministry came to Bali to investigate the nature of their religious practice, asking such questions as 'what is the name of the religion practiced in Bali','In terms of belief in One God, what kind of philosophy and theology does it have?'etc. In fact the ministry gradually established the definition of 'religion' in accordance with Islam, that is belief in one Supreme God, prophets, holy scripture, confession of faith, a formalised method of prayer and so on. In view of such definition of 'religion', the daily practice in Bali might fall short of being called a religion. In quite a polytheic tradition, which could be a Supreme God? Among the centrifugal tradition of various levels of priest, what would be the central holy scripture? Tradition in Bali is what Gombrich calls a communal religion in Durkheimian sense(Gombrich 1988, p.26), which is distinct from soteriology represented by Judeo-Christian tradition.

Despite such fundamental difficulty, however, Balinese leaders tried desperately to formulate the essence of Hinduism in Bali in accordance with the official definition of religion. A very ambiguous deity called Sang Hyang Widi, which had been virtually unknown to the general public and only apparent in high priests' esoteric religious texts was elevated to the position of very Supreme Hindu God(Swellengrebel 1960, p.71; Forge 1980, p.229). Saints from Balinese history were chosen as equivalents to the prophets in Islam. And as regards the holy scripture, efforts began to be made to compile a standard text

for Hindu teaching, are eventually realised as Upadeṣa in 1967(Howell 1977, p.232). Geertz argues that these changes are a process of rationalisation from the ritual-centered religious practices to a more systematised, rationalised religion, and he called the whole process 'internal conversion'(Geertz 1973).

But what Geertz observed in 1958 was just a beginning of a long dramatic change in the Balinese religious system. At the end of the same year, after long debates between the ministry and the local authorities, Hinduism in Bali was eventually recognised as religion, and a Hindu section was established in the ministry. Corresponding to this change, the Hindu Council called Parisada, was established in Bali. This is an amalgam of various preceding Hindu organisations, consisting of Brahmanical priests (pedanda), lower caste temple priests(pemangku) as well as laymen(Anandakusuma 1979, pp.76-77). From the outset the Hindu Council intended to reform chaotic religious practices in Bali by introducing standardised doctrine, simplifying the elaborate ritual cycles, and establishing a centralised hierarchy within the temple system. Mass worship of Sang Hyang Widi was introduced in the central temple built by the Council in Den Pasar, and school religious education was also prepared(Howell 1977, p.153; Forge 1980, p.229). Such policy, however, was greeted by stubborn resistance by the people. The mass worship to Sang Hyang Widi was harshly criticised because of its political nature, and the attempt to centralise the temple network was superseded by a newly emerging inter-regional temple network created because of the villagers' increasing concern about their ancestral temples(Boon 1977, pp.217-218)(3). The greatest irony, however, was the centennial ritual called Eka Dasa Rudra held for the purification of the whole island, organised under the guidance of the Council itself. It was held in 1963, but then Mount Agung, generally believed to be an extinct volcano, suddenly erupted and many people died(Forge 1980, pp.227-228). The subsequent massacre of communists after the so-called 30th of September affair gave the Balinese a very strong impression that such serial disorder was caused by the improper practice of the Eka ritual. Hence the Council, despite its principle of the simplification of ritual systems, was forced to repeat the Eka ritual in 1979 with the utmost efforts to hold its proper performance(Forge 1980, pp.230-231).

Thus, within Bali, the Council's effort to simplify the Balinese religious system faced difficulties in progressing further. But this is only one side of the coin. The fact that the Balinese Hinduism was recognised as one of the state religions gradually gave rise to a new phenomenon, i.e., the emergence of Hinduism in places detached from its birthplace, Bali. The Council version of rationalised Hinduism, which was a product of the interaction between the state definition of religion modelled on Islam and the Balinese religious reality, failed to promote itself within Bali, but now this new Hinduism finds its place

beyond that small Island.

The struggle for the recognition of one's own religion by the state is not confined to Balinese Hinduism. Some ethnic groups in south Kalimantan, collectively called Dayak (Ot Danum, Ngaju, Luangan, Maanyan) share a basic cosmology and religious practice based on shamans named balian (Weinstock 1987; cf. Schärer 1946). Under growing pressure from the neighbouring Banjarese Muslims, the Dayaks tried to establish the Dayak Alliance, which was tacitly supported by the Dutch authorities. After Indonesian Independence, the new Government would not accept a claim for the establishment in the administrative division for the Dayaks, and they were forced to stay within the Province of South Kalimantan which is dominated by the Banjarese Muslims (Miles 1976, pp.106-115). The antagonism between them was further escalated when the so-called Darul-Islam (house of Islam) movement erupted in various part of Indonesia and began to resist the Javanese-dominated central government to establish an Islamic state (Van Dijk 1987). In 1957 after military clashes between the Dayaks and the Banjarese, President Sukarno finally allowed the Dayaks to establish the Province of Central Kalimantan, and their religion, named Kaharingan, was authorised as one of the state religions. But in fact Kaharingan was not recognised as a completely independent religion, but as a part of Hinduism (Weinstock 1983, p.193)(4). The basis of this identification was the rather dubious argument that Kaharingan was one of the remnants of the past Hindu-Buddhist era before the Indonesian archipelago was influenced by Islam. Now there was a happy reunion between Kaharingan and the real developed Hinduism in Bali. Thus Kaharingan shrewdly escaped the perennial pressure of the Banjarese Muslims but then faced another pressure, that of the Hindu Council.

Weinstock witnessed two very intriguing cases which indicate the on-going interaction between Dayaks and their new religious patron (Weinstock 1983, pp.193-195). One concerned the local government of Central Kalimantan in Parangkaraya. A number of Balinese worked there as bureaucrats, and they actively maintained contact with the leaders of Kaharingan, successfully persuading them to go to Bali to learn about the real ancestor of their religion, gradually the offices of these leaders exhibited Balinese sculptures rather than those of the Dayaks'. The other was a meeting in Ampah city, held by local leaders of Kaharingan who had recently returned from their Bali-tour. These leaders emphatically reported to the public the similarity between Kaharingan and Balinese Hinduism. And at the end of the report, they said that as Kaharingan was now recognised as a formal religion, they had to behave accordingly. Hence they started to pray quietly and a plate for contributions was sent round. What they envisaged in considering the term 'official religion'

was the nearby church, so they rashly concluded an imitation of Christian customs would be the best way to behave as followers of a 'formal religion'.

This shows that the expansion and influence of Hinduism was still nominal, as this is also the case with the Toraja of Central Sulawesi, well-known for their highly developed mortuary rituals (Yamashita 1988, pp.276-277)(5), but in some places, systematic introduction of the Hindu-Council version of reformed Hinduism has already started, as can be seen in the case of the Tenggerese, around Mt. Bromo in eastern Java. These people retain to an extent their ritual-oriented religious system originating from the Hindu-Majapahit era even after the Islamisation of Java. Thus their ritual cycle is distinct from the rest of the Javanese, and they call their system religion of Buda(Hefner 1985,p.4). This area became the best hiding place for Islamic guerrillas which led to politico-religious tension between these Muslims and the reclusive Tenggerese. To gain a governmental protection, they established contact with the Hindu Council, and finally large number of them converted to Balinese Hinduism(Hefner 1985, pp.239-241, pp.247-249). What is striking about this case is the actual historical connection between the Tenggerese ritual system and that of the Balinese. The Tenggerese priests share the Kawi prayer with Balinese middle rank priests called sengguh. Some of the rituals in Tengger have the same names as those in Bali, and they also share a number of ritual paraphernalia(Hefner 1985, pp.271-272; cf. Hooykaas 1964a, 1964b, 1974). Thus the identification between these two religious systems has some factual ground, unlike Kabaringan. But the religion that the Hindu Council introduced in Tengger was not the Hinduism practiced in every day Bali, but a systematised, reformed doctrine of Hinduism.

At first the change was still minimal when the officials were of Tengger origin. But in late 70's, teachers outside Tengger who had studied text-book Hinduism at school and knew nothing about the Tenggerese ritual cycle began to teach at school in Tengger. Their view of Tengger religious practice reflected the reformist Muslim's view of the strict separation of religion and custom, which was implicitly introduced into Hindu Council's own ideology of Hinduism. Thus these teachers regarded the Tenggerese ritual system as merely custom without any intrinsic religious value. They tried to reduce the number of rituals and introduced a mass Hindu prayer of Hindu Council-style (Hefner 1985, pp.253-254). Hindu reformism, which seemed to have failed in their homeland because of the persistent ritualism in Bali, now found an ideal place for its realisation. This case clearly shows the potential threat of the pressure from the Hindu Council which imposed its newly built doctrine on other parts of Indonesia which accepted Hinduism, such as the Dayaks and the Torajas. Their religions might have eschewed the growing pressure from Islam since they were recognised as part

of Hinduism, but Hinduism itself had changed its character from its original ritualism to the systematic doctrine.

Here we can distinguish four levels of meaning within the word 'Hinduism' in contemporary Indonesia. The first level is the indigenous system of ritual and popular knowledge in Bali which in fact is rather misleading to be called Hinduism as such, because of its utterly practical nature. The second level is the rationalised form of this practical religion, which might be called 'Baliism' as Geertz once named it; This is a reformed version of daily practice, with the emphasis of diminishing the number of rituals, intergration of chaotic temple systems, construction of the Parisada central temple, and worship of Sang Hyang Widi. Geertz's argument of 'internal conversion' chiefly concerns with this aspect of Hinduism. But the official recognition of Bali Hinduism as one of the state religion accerelated the separation of Hinduism from its birth place Bali, Hinduism being transformed into a more universalistic, soteriological religion with standardised holy scripture, systematised doctrine in correspondence with Indian philosophy and a number of new compact rituals far different from those of the overdevelopped indigenous ritual cycles in Balinese villages(6). This is a portable Hinduism designed for non-Balinese Hindus, and this is what the Dayaks, the Torajas and the Tenggerese are forced to learn at school as Hinduism writ large.

The fourth level is, as a matter of fact, yet to come, but a glimpse of its possibility can be seen in the case of a Javanese mystic called Haridjanto, who first founded the Javanese branch of Parisada in Surakarta. He is a person who introduced Hinduism systematically after the so-called 30th of September Affair in 1965, but finally separated himself from the control of Balinese Parisada and established Javanese version of Hinduism (Lyon 1977; Howell 1977). His criticism of Parisada Hinduism, represented by the level three above, reveals the peculiar nature of the national Hinduism in Indonesia, which could not avoid being influenced by the reformist version of Islam as a hidden paradigm. Hardjanto believed that the official doctrine of Hinduism called Upadeça, published by Parisada in 1967, completely neglected the meditative aspect of Hinduism, and overemphasised the scripturalistic learning of the teaching legitimised by Parisada. Since he detected the elements of Middle-eastern monotheism in Hinduism à la Parisada(Howell 1977, pp.233-234), he eventually decided to set up an organisation called Sadhar Mapan( Sanaatana Dharma Majapahit dan Pancasila, Real Religion of Majapahit and Pancasila), to embody the authentic Javanese (esoteric or tantric) Hinduism, stressing the meditative practice of the Javanese mysticism.

This is the product of hybridisation between national reformist Hinduism and the local meditative tradition of Java, which should be called the fourth level

of Hinduism. This process of hybridisation is still limited as a result of insufficient infiltration of the state Hinduism into the Dayaks, the Torajas and the Tenggerese, but the more firmly the religious education and administration is established, the more explicitly such hybridisation is expected to be observable.

Such stratified description of Hinduism in Indonesia, however, falls short of grasping far more intricate network of interaction within the frame of the new nation. The religious interaction between Bali and other parts of Indonesia cannot simply be explained by the fact that these localities accept blindly the official version of reformist Hinduism. Rather, we have to pay attention to other factors, such as the visual attractiveness of Balinese ritual systems, which has inspired non-Balinese visitors such as the Dayaks and the Tenggerese with the idea that they share the same cultural backbone with the Balinese, or the governmental project of tourism which strategically identifies Toraja with Bali to create the second tourist attraction.

To put it in a nutshell, Hinduism in Indonesia, which once was simply an amalgam of local custom and ritual cycles in Balinese villages, eventually developed a very complex structure as a result of the recognition by the Government as one of the state religions, and in this process, it dramatically transformed the character from the first level up to the hybrid level of four. This is what did not happen to the Javanese religious tradition, kebatinan.

In contrast with the dramatic change of Hinduism in Bali, Javanese religion vis-a-vis the state traced a quite different path. As I mentioned, Javanese religion can be vaguely categorised as orthodox Islam and Javanist nominal Islam, the latter of which some people think to be distinct from Islam. Thus the struggle for the official recognition of the Javanese religious system cannot be the same as that of Balinese Hindu's, because Hinduism in Bali can be legitimised by the very existence of Indian Hinduism, while Javanese religious tradition cannot find such correspondence in world religion except Islam, and the identification with Islam was exactly what these Javanists rejected to accept.

Thus the strategy for these Javanists were to acquire the official status for the Javanist religious tradition outside the definition of religion. In fact outside the mainstream Islam, there have been enormous number of religious sects in Java; their religious practices show wide range of variety from sophisticated metaphysical speculation of the nature of self and God influenced by the royal and theosophical tradition, to pragmatic healing by mediums possessed by various spirits. Such various religious tradition is loosely called kebatinan, originally from Arabic bathin, inner self, and usually translated as Javanese mysticism(7).

After Indonesian Independence, some of the political leaders who had been deeply involved in kebatinan proposed to establish a governmental body to study and practice the kebatinan tradition(8). But the Ministry of Religion was clearly offended by such movement, and was also alarmed by the rapid growth of kebatinan groups which counted almost 360 in Java in 1953(K.W.I. 1973, p.229)(9). From the beginning they thought that these kebatinan sects were merely deviation from Islam, and kept a watch on them suspiciously.

Kebatinan groups on the other hand tried to formulate the essence of kebatinan distinct from the official definition of religion. They set up an organization called the Committee for Indonesian Kebatinan Congress(B.K.K.I) to have a congress roughly biannually. The arguments in the meetings were devoted for how to define kebatinan, so the first meeting in 1955 concluded that the essence of kebatinan was 'Sepi ing pamrih, ramé ing gawe, memayu hayuing bawana' ('To restrain your desire, positive in action, making this world orderly' which is a well-known Javanese maxim of ideal conduct.) The second formulation was in turn 'Kebatinan adalah sumberasas dan sila Ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa, untuk mencapai budi luhur, guna kesempurnaan hidup' ('Kebatinan is the principle and the creed of 'Belief in One Supreme God' for the sake of attaining high morality and the completion of life.' To establish a new legal status, these kebatinan leaders were faced with a number of difficulties. One of such difficulties was whether kebatinan is a part of the Javanese tradition or something more inter-

local(Indonesian).The large majority of these kebatinan sects are from Java, and the first definition clearly demonstrates their conviction of kebatinan as a part of the Javanese culture. This position, however, has shortcomings. If kebatinan is simply identified with Javanese culture, it should be contained in the rather denigrated concept of custom, which manifestly has connotation of inferiority to religion. And the Ministry of Religion might be very happy that kebatinan is after all just something cultural rather than universal. Thus such blunt association with Javanese culture should be avoided and replaced with something based on the frame work of Indonesia. Thus we get the second version of definition. This version has a clear shift of emphasis; now the definition is written in Indonesian rather than Javanese, and the relation between kebatinan and the first item of Pancasila, i.e., the five principle of the state is referred to. This subtle shift of the emphasis predicts the line of the whole argument later, but at this stage, the definition is still quite abstract, as compared to the clear-cut goal of Balinese Hinduism to assimilate themselves to the definition of religion stipulated by Muslims.

Aside from the problem of its cultural background, they had to deal with another question, whether kebatinan should be called new religion (agama baru) or not. Many kebatinan groups often used the term religion (agama) like religion of Sabta Darma, but along with the crystallisation of the definition of official religion by the Ministry, the idea of new religion itself was forcibly discarded. Thus in the second Congress of kebatinan, there emerged a new idea that kebatinan is not new religion as such, but a foundation which deepens our understanding of existing religions(10). Thus they claimed that the essence of kebatinan is only founded on the belief in one God, irrespective of its doctrine or forms of worship. As the kebatinan congress is an amalgam of miscellaneous groups, it might be wise and practical to define it as loose as possible like this for the sake of solidarity, but for those who have established doctrine and do not hesitate to claim that theirs are also religion, this kind of vague definition was quite dissatisfactory. Thus the effort to work out any coherent definition of kebatinan was not really successful especially during Sukarno era. But unlike the following period of Suharto's new order, Sukarno took a rather loose laissez-faire policy to kebatinan sects, so a number of very radical, politicised kebatinan sects emerged. A sect said that President Sukarno was an incarnation of God, and his words and deeds are identical with God's(El Hafiady 1977, pp.29-31); another sect advocated that Islam is a religion of colonisation by the Arabs and that the real Mecca is not over there but in Jember, east Java. The leader sat on Al-Qu'ran in front of the public to show that this is just printed paper and nothing more(Tanah Air, 1951)(11). Such challenging attitude of these sects to the established religion resulted in the

radical confrontation between them and orthodox Muslims after so-called 30th of September Affair, which eventually led to the downfall of Sukarno Government. The communist party was officially banned and hundreds of thousands people who were alleged to be communists or sympathisers were killed by the military and raging Muslim youth groups. These radical kebatinan groups were also suffered very much from such attack by Muslims, officially banned or forced to convert(12).

Muslim leaders expected a smooth increase of converts to Islam, but the reality was far from it; the number of Christian converts developed rapidly(Ricklefs 1981, p.273), and to their surprise the conversion to newly recognised Hinduism was also phenomenal. Clifford Geertz at his revisit of his former research site in east Java in 1970 was appalled to find that there were thousands of Javanese Hindus there, which he says unthinkable in 1952(Geertz 1972)(13).

Subarto Government, however, gradually revealed its own kebatinan orientation. At first, Subarto himself is influenced by kebatinan(Jenkins 1984, pp.29-36); one of his political advisor named Sujono Humardani was a well-known spirit medium, thus nicknamed the minister of mysticism or even Rasputin (McDonald 1980, chap.6). In addition, after virtually eradicating the communist element in Indonesian politics, the main target for the Government in turn was the politicised radical Muslim element, and for the purpose of the containment of such potentially dangerous power, it was thought to be useful to give kebatinan a full legal status.

In 1970, the first symposium on kebatinan was held after the Subarto era, where a new legal strategy was proposed by the chairman. That is, to make use of the semantic ambiguity of the Constitution of 1945 to its extreme. The second item of the article 29, reads as follows: The state guarantees every citizen the freedom to have one's own religion and to worship according to religion and (its) belief(kepercayaannya itu)(14). The last part of the article is semantically ambiguous; its common sensical reading might be 'according to religion and belief in it'. But kebatinan sects read it as two juxtaposing elements, i.e., religion and belief. With this semantic trick, kebatinan sects began a campaign that the status of kebatinan had been legally guaranteed by the constitution, with the name of belief. Consequently, they replaced the word kebatinan with a new word kepercayaan(belief), hence they called themselves as belief groups(aliran kepercayaan).

As compared to a rather sloppy attempt to define kebatinan during the Sukarno era, this new strategy was eventually based on more solid legal ground. But this also aroused very heated controversy and opposition from the Muslims block. 'To recognise kebatinan and to give it legal status means to regress to animism'; 'Kebatinan is a degenerate form of Islamic mysticism'; 'There is a danger of

mixing up the product of human being with God's revelation'; 'Such kebatinan sects will destroy the existent religious order in this society'..etc(15). Such heated criticism, however, could not prevent the term belief(kepercayaan) from being inserted in the Outline of the National Policy in 1973, which meant the official recognition of the legal status of belief. Hence the birth of belief.

But this success incurred backlash from the Ministry of Religion. Since kebatinan was defined not as something like new religion but as belief in contrast with religion, ministry responsible for the belief groups would no longer be the Ministry of Religion. Thus the administration for the belief group was transferred to the Ministry of Education and Culture, and up to now they are responsible for registering and coordinating the activities of these kebatinan sects.

This clear dichotomy of religion and belief in terms of law and administration continuously arouses a number of problems. Under the Suharto government, religion became a must for every citizen: you are not allowed not to have a religion, because that means you are a communist. Hence religious identity is very important for the official procedure, and you have to fill the item of religion in your identity card.

As the identity card is concerned, the Government has already instructed to put the mark of —•— as the sign of a follower of belief in the item of religion. This instruction is not carried out at all at the lower level of the administration. A rumor says that provincial governments of Java refused to enforce this, because of some officials' deep-rooted prejudice against kebatinan/belief. At district or village level, it is quite rare that officials understand the meaning of such strange sign, nor do followers of kebatinan. Thus it often happens that the followers of kebatinan are forced to identify themselves as Muslims, or are suspected of being communists, eventually interrogated by the police(16).

The kebatinan sects, however, has no unified stance on this point. Some sects, such as Sapta Darma, claim the complete independence and autonomy of kebatinan, so this identity problem is a crucial point to defend; others like Subud, which identify themselves as something auxiliary to the official religions, do not care much even if they are categorised as Muslims. This dissaray of opinion within the kebatinan front virtually weaken their power to give unified pressure to the local government to enforce the instruction from above.

Another problem is the life cycle rituals. The Government enacted a new marriage law which authorises marriage outside the Islamic law. Consequently, non-Islamic marriage can be registered in Civil Registration Office, not in the Muslim dominated local office of religion (KUA) any longer(McDonald 1980,

chap.6). After enactment of this law, some kebatinan sects began to perform their own ritual for marriage (and funeral) distinct from the ordinary ones. For instance, members of Sapta Darma, which I have mentioned, invented a collective meditation to ask God for blessing in place for the traditional ceremony. The local office and police put this in question, and this invention was eventually banned.

The Outline of the National Policy emphasised that belief is not allowed to aim to become a religion. Then how about having its own system of rituals distinct from what are stipulated by the official religions? One of the local leaders of kebatinan(17) thought it natural for these sects to have their own wedding and so on, partly because the new marriage law authorises marriage based on custom (adat-istiadat). But this inference was harshly criticised by the Ministry of Religion on the ground that this is an explicit attempt for the followers of kebatinan to religionise their creed. It might sound like a scholastic argument whether such ritual cycles belong to religion or custom, but as the Javanese traditional life cycle rituals are concerned, Islamic elements are inseparable part of the whole procedure of customary rituals. So if a kebatinan sect tries to replace Islamic rituals with their own style, it looks as if they were trying to replace customary rites with their bizzare new religious system. Here you can see the discrepancy between the state definition of dichotomy of religion and culture and that of everyday life: kebatinan after all, is rather consciously built ideological system different from daily practices. In that sense, wedding and funeral carried out by Sapta Darma, for instance, is a very new system, and it is quite understandable that the Minister of Religion as well as local Government officials reacted suspiciously against such invention.

Despite such problems, kebatinan sects tried to establish firmer ground for their status: Organisationally, it is the establishment of HPK, and ideologically, continuous effort to clarify the meaning of belief.

Suharto Government encouraged to establish a coordinating body for kebatinan groups, which at first was called SKK( Secretariate for Cooperation of Belief), then after the legal authorisation of kebatinan, HPK(Association of Believers in One Supreme God). It is expected that every Regency has its branch, around which the daily activities of these kebatinan sects should be coordinated. HPK is under the umbrella of the massive Governmental party named Golkar (Functinal Group) and HPK's personnel affairs are indirectly controled by its local branch. At the same time, however, the local branch of the Ministry of Education and Culture is wholly responsible for registering and guiding kebatinan groups. In addition, there is another organisation which is in charge of kebatinan, i.e., PAKEM(The office of suveillance of Social Belief Groups) which initially

belonged to the Public prosecution office, then reorganised to include the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Religion, the police and the army (K.W.I. 1973, p.231, p.235). This indicates the Government's ambivalent attitude towards the possible deviation of kebatinan. Thus the local kebatinan politics is based on four organisations, i.e., HPK, the Ministry of Education, Golkar and PAKEM. The balance of power among these four elements differs enormously in every Regency. In case of Pati Regency, the mutual relations ran very smoothly: the officer of culture ( kasi kebudayaan) who is responsible for registering and guiding kebatinan affair in the Ministry of Education, was himself a follower of kebatinan sect, and was very active to guide the HPK meeting, while in Golkar there were some local MP's who were also kebatinan followers. In contrast, the situation in adjacent Kudus Regency faced a total dissaray: The officer of culture was a Muslim antagonistic to kebatinan; the first chairman of HPK was opposed by a kebatinan oriented local MP of Golkar, who made a new organisation outside of HPK; Local Golkar was dominated by devout Muslims quite antagonistic to kebatinan. Consequently there were several factions who made a fuss over who would control HPK.

Such picture of confusion around the local politics of kebatinan is a result of the heterogenous religious convictions for the members of such organisations responsible for kebatinan politics. Some orthodox Muslims are quite antagonistic towards kebatinan, believing that it is just a disgusting deviation from proper religions. So they tend to believe that their mission would be to show these lost sheep the right way, and when they hold a job related to kebatinan affairs, they make effort to urge them to go back to Islam. Thus the stability of local kebatinan politics relies heavily on the proportion of Muslims and kebatinan followers in each organisations.

The administrative confusion at the local level, however, is not a mere reflection of what occurs at the central level: There the kebatinan leaders face a rather different problem to solve, i.e., the identity of belief. Although I have deliberately used the term belief as an equivalent of kebatinan to facilitate the comprehension, in fact they are different, and the difference grows larger as the discussion goes on at the center.

As I have mentioned, the concept of belief is defined as something which has a legal status parallel to official religion. But as the substance is concerned, there is much ambiguity. Although the official definition of belief stipulates that this is a part of indigenous culture/custom, it never demonstrates any particular local culture existing in Indonesia. Thus one cannot talk about kebatinan in the name of belief, because the former is a distinctive local tradition of Java, while the latter is just a legal term artificially fabricated by the state. And what matters now at the centre is this concept of

belief, not of kebatinan.

Take national TV program for instance. There is a weekly program named Lecture on Religion, in which leaders of each official religions talk about the essence of their creed in half an hour. But beside the five official religions, there is another program named Lecture on Belief, given by the chairman of central HPK, who was a leader of Sumarah, one of the most influential sects in Java(18). This Lecture on Belief attracted my attention by its very lack of substance. What he emphasised under the name of belief was only one thing, i.e., remember God(Ingatlah Tuhan in Indonesian or eling marang Gusti in Javanese), and other part of the lecture was quite abstract, almost nothing in content. Almost every lecture was repetitious, without any further notion of concrete doctrine, duties or cosmology. This may reflect the doctrinal simplicity of Sumarah, but here we should see the fundamental dilemma of the concept of belief.

Unlike the doctrinal crystallisation of Balinese Hinduism by means of copying Islam and borrowing much elements from the Indian classics, what belief has is the concrete miscellaneous sects which share no doctrinal unity. To make the matter worse, the concept of kebatinan in Sukarno era which still had a strong connotation of Javanese culture, was replaced by more abstract concept of belief. Consequently the definition of belief cannot rely on Javanese local formulation any longer. Now the notion of belief is based on Indonesia, not Java, and if its definition says that it belongs to the domain of culture/custom, one has to show that there is a fundamental identity among cultures and customs in Indonesia which guarantees the substantial unity of belief in various localities.

One of the leaders of HPK in the Province of Central Java writes as follows:

Basicly before the arrival of Hinduism to our archipelago, the Indonesian people had already had belief in One Supreme God. It was not that Indonesian people had animistic and polytheic worship for plants, stones and stars as has been described as such by the authors on animism like Wilken, Adriani, Kruyt and Taylor, but that Indonesian people had held monotheistic view... Plants, stones and stars were not worshipped, but made means for the belief in one God(Toeloes n.d.,4).

Thus before the existence of the official religions in Indonesia, they had already shared a common belief in One God, and he, for the purpose of proving it, picks up names of deities in various cultures in Indonesia such as Maharaja Kulung Rahum in Kalimantan, Puang Matua in Toraja, Ratu Langi in Minahasa, and so forth(Toeloes n.d.,3). Now the focus is not Javanese mysticism but the allegedly common cultural heritage of the Indonesian people, and the only thin

thread which binds them is the notion of belief in one God.

This is why the TV lecture on belief is so abstract, lacking in content. As the state definition of belief is deprived of its original Javanese background of kebatinan, what the commentators can do is to repeat its legal basis, that is the first principle of Pancasila. But if the definition of belief simply relies on 'belief in one Supreme God' without any particular doctrinal elaboration, it might be rather difficult to confine it within the realm of Indonesia. In other words, the phenomena of belief in one Supreme God cannot be said to be particularly Indonesian. And in fact in some cases, kebatinan sects have already gone beyond the national border to spread all over the world like Subud. Even in case of Sumarah, there are already positive approach to foreigners and they provide a western instructor to teach foreigners how to meditate.

This tendency of de-Indonesianisation(internationalisation), however, is only observable among the large nation-wide kebatinan sects; the majority of the Javanese kebatinan sects are still hedged around by their particular cultural backgrounds and complex system of doctrine. Such bifurcation of belief between the abstractive tendency at the level of Jakarta moving away from particular local diversity, and strengthened emphasis on the distinctiveness of local tradition at the level of periphery, causes an acute problem in every day life, i.e., education. The fact that a certain creed is authorised by the state as one of the official religions does not only mean that one's religious identity is written in the identity card, but also that one is bestowed the right to have a proper religious education at school, which further implies the establishment of adequate religious textbook, curriculum, and the school for religious teachers. Actually, the Hindu Council compiled the textbooks which precisely reflect the reformist ideology, and Hindu teachers schools are instrumental in producing dogmatic Hindu teachers spreading all over Indonesia.

Thus if belief is given the equivalent legal status as religion, one should also have a system of school education for it, otherwise children would suffer from educational vacuum. But then what to teach? Here the gap between the abstract state definition and the endless variety of particular kebatinan sects give rise to a very concrete difficulty. It is out of question to teach children each doctrines they belong to, because the school education needs to be standardised. Then shall we teach Javanese tradition to them? But belief is not confined to the Javanese tradition; rather, it is a national heritage by definition. Thus we are forced to retreat to the point of vague state definition which is simply based on Pancasila. It might sound like the educational version of TV lecture on belief, but here lies an intriguing difference. At the level of education, there is obligatory curriculum named

PMP(Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, Education of Pancasila morality). Pupils have to learn the five principles along with subsidiary items to develop a firm morality based on Pancasila. And naturally the first principle, belief in One Supreme God, has already been included in this PMP. As a result, imaginably it would be most difficult to separate the first principle of Pancasila from the rest and establish something distinct from this PMP.

This emphasis on the administrative confusion may give the reader an impression that as a matter of fact, the notion of belief has exerted no intrinsic effect on the content of people's daily religious practice, or shall I say, popular knowledge, as a result of its semantic ambiguity. I insist, however, that this is not the case. The fact is that the notion of belief in One God has been gradually affecting any kebatinan followers who more or less are conscious of the doctrinal content of what they are practising. I will present two cases of spirit cult group in Java to show how the aforementioned notion binds their mainline doctrine as well as everyday discourse.

Tunggul Sabda Jati (TSJ, the Banner of the Real Word) is one of such spirit cult groups, which I have examined in Fukushima(1987). The head office of this sect is located in Gombong, southern part of Central Java, but the followers are found in various parts of Central and East Java. The leader of this sect, an official of the local Government of Gombong, is a spirit medium, possessed by the spirit of Semar, an ugly but deeply beloved clown-god, who mainly appears in Javanese and Balinese shadow theatre based on Indian epics and is also regarded as the guardian spirit of Java.

The problem the followers of such a spirit cult group are confronted with is how to reconcile the general definition of kebatinan as 'belief in One God' with their particular concern with local deities like Semar. This is especially problematic for these supporters of spirit cult, because they often have strong self-awareness as kebatinan-followers in contrast with orthodox Muslims, hence more conscious of the official definition of belief than philosophy oriented syncretic mystics, as a result of the spirit cult being unacceptable by Islamic orthodoxy.

To make a long story short, the interpretive solution of this problem among the followers of TSJ are quite varied: one of the official line of argument is that Semar is a messenger of God, and each country has her own messenger, who transmits the divine message to the people. This definition, however, smells of Islamic orthodoxy, simply replacing Prophet Muhammad with the ethnic deity Semar. Others counterargue, more based on the widely accepted belief that God is but another name for the innermost self, that Semar grows automatically in our body, and that when man attains ultimate unification with God, naturally Semar

can be united with the person in the form of divine insight (wahyu). This suggests the virtual identity between God and Semar, though they say Semar is reluctant to be called so.

The fluctuation of the interpretation between the superimposed official doctrine of belief in One God and the particular concern for the local deities is also reflected in their religious practices. As a spirit cult group, one of TSJ's main activities is a collective seance, in which Semar, through the medium, reveals prophecies, tenders advices to the attendants as to their fortune, health, family problem, and so forth. This worship of Semar, however, is counterbalanced with the emphasis on the practice of meditation as a form of direct prayer to God. But this emphasis, theoretically speaking at least, is somewhat confusing, because if the idea of meditation as a direct means of communication between man and God is accepted, there will be no need of any mediators or messengers. If you can contact with God through meditation, you do not need Semar as a messenger of God any longer; if you succeed in communicating Semar instead, you also will not need a spirit medium. In any case, advocating the importance of meditation is somewhat self-defeating for such a spirit cult group as TSJ, and one of the main criticisms made by the fellow kebatinan-followers exactly is that the phenomenon of spirit possession is not in accordance with the ideal of kebatinan, i.e., ultimate quietness of the inner-self and unification between man and God. For those who believe in this ideal, the spirit cult just does not promote the belief in One God, but servility to capricious, unreliable spirits. Faced with such criticism, what the leaders can do is to demonstrate spirit possession in public and to appeal for the popular support, rather than to try to convince the suspicious fellow critics that their story of Semar is consistent with belief in One God.

The discursive and/or practical ambiguities which TSJ shows is but a visible case of clash between the state ideology of belief in One God embodied with the practice of meditation as the most important means, and the local reality of spirit cult not diminishing its influence in spite of the incessant criticism made by the high-brow mystics and adamant orthodox Muslims.

But there is another case where the superimposed ideal of belief in One God and the drive for spirit possession are reconciled somewhat more successfully than the awkward TSJ: Wiweka in Surakarta described briefly in Fukushima (1989). The main focus of this sect is to create a condition of spirit possession by means of meditative practices. A trainee should meditate to get into a trance, guided by a trainer who appears to be already possessed with a certain Javanese deity, speaking in old fashioned Javanese like that of the shadow play puppeteer (dalang). When he successfully attains the trance, a voice is expected to come out from his throat, which initially would be unintelligible

murmur. This state is called 'union mystique', and when it reaches higher degree of the union, the voice will deliver a clearer message, just like that of the trainer's.

It is quite obvious that these leaders of the group had suffered from chronic spirit attack before they joined the organisation. And phenomenally speaking at least, the behaviour of the meditators are exactly the same with the possessed mediums found in other sects. But what draws our attention is that the other-worldly voices the members produce while practising meditation are not attributed to the exterior spirits. In place of explaining the phenomenon in terms of spirit possession, Wiweka emphasises the union between man and God: by means of controlling the breath, the prana à la Yoga circulates in one's body, finally reaching one's head when the union with God is attained. Then the prana comes down from the head to the throat, where it produces a divine voice called nada sabda.

This is one of the rare cases where the dominant and highly rigid discourse of belief in One God is somehow reconciled with the general phenomenon of spirit possession. Here the general doubt about the authenticity of the voice produced by spirit medium is ingeniously eluded by constituting the voice not as the product of the exterior spirit but as the result of strengthening one's inner self by means of personal meditative endeavour. But such doctrinal success is but a rare case, and as a result, HPK meetings I attended were filled with both apparent uniformity of formal discourse as to the nature of belief, and implicit but clearly ineradicable dissension among spirit cult supporters, theosophical high-brows, and semi-religious meditators.

The kebatinan tradition in Java, the largest and most influential local culture in Indonesia, has been confronted with the problem of identity as a result of the ambiguous polarisation in it. In one extreme, there has been constant pressure from the orthodox Muslims to reduce it to Islam. As the possibility of the idea of new religions was denied, kebatinan was forced to be given a rather contradicting definition of being something appertaining to culture, but legally equivalent to religion. This definition is virtually incompatible with the orthodox Muslims' conviction that culture is inferior to religion, because the latter is created by God, while the former is just a human product. As a result, the legal basis of kebatinan could be vulnerable against the Muslims' criticism.

The other extreme is the possibility of identifying kebatinan with Hinduism. This idea gained a certain amount of popularity after the 30th September Affair, which was seen in the massive conversion to it. However, as Hardjanto pointed out, this new Hinduism completely lacks the meditative element which is deeply

embedded in Javanese kebatinan. Thus the attempt to identify kebatinan with official Hinduism was doomed to be a failure.

Consequently, kebatinan should struggle within the frame of culture. But as I have mentioned, on the one hand, there is a demand for belief to be appertaining to culture and to be equivalent with religion simultaneously, on the other hand, there is a perenial tug-of-war between particular local cultures and demand for Indonesianisation. The abstract legal definition of belief strengthens the pressure for Indonesianisation, and just like the Javanese language, which failed to be a national language inspite of its largest population, kebatinan is forced to reorganise itself within the context of Indonesia. Thus at any rate, kebatina cannot find its clear-cut identity, and as a result, in the center leaders monotonously repeat 'Remember God', while in the countries, sects, institutions, Muslims and Christians keep on fighting a m el e which leads them to nowhere.

To consider the historical change of religious system under a strong influence of the state like Indonesia, the conventional analytical tool like the rationalisation of religion or any kind of unilinear developmental analysis falls short of elucidating the complexity of the whole configuration of interrelated factors. Thus, describing the religious change of Balinese Hinduism and Javanese kebatinan simply as rationalisation would miss the significant difference of these two patterns of change.

What strikes me in case of Indonesia is the crucial role of the state in the process of religious change. As I have emphasised, in contemporary Indonesia, religion is not just a personal choice; rather it is a duty for a citizen to perform so as to show that one is not a communist. Thus the system of definition stipulated by the state is not simply buried in thick legal documents in the center, but structuralises citizens' lives by way of various administrative channels.

But such pressure to the individual to hold official religion does not simply come from the state. Historically speaking, it is the confrontation with Islam which led various religio-ethnic minorities to the reformulation of their symbolic system. The impact has been multiple and through various channels. On the one hand, their virtual domination of the Ministry of Religion resulted in the establishment of the definition of religion in the model of Islam, which urged Balinese Hindus and Buddhists to transform their creeds into something new. On the other hand, various radical Muslim movement from Islamic Alliance and Reformist Islam Movement in 1910's and 1920's (Alfian 1969; Noer 1973), Dar'ul Islam and other separatist movements in Sukarno era (Van Dijk 1981; Harvey 1977), and the massacre of communists after the 30th September of 1965,

gave constant impact on minority religions to reorganise their system by partly incorporating the very Islamic elements to defend them from such pressure.

Having said that, Indonesia as a state shows a peculiar characteristic as to its religious policy. Despite of the nominal majority of Muslims and its de facto impact on the religious policy, Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Nor is it an unyieldingly secular state where freedom of religion is completely guaranteed. The founding principle of the state, Pancasila, is itself a product of compromise between Islam and various types of secular ideologies. Thus the Indonesian politics of religion is torn between various dichotomous polarities, such as religion vs. secularism and its extreme version, radical Moslems vs. Communists; religion vs. custom; local culture vs. Indonesia, and so on. Under the present Government, communist element is officially denied, and now the target is the other side of the continuum, the element of radical Islam. Islam is acceptable when it is moderate enough to co-exist with other religions. Religions in turn should learn to co-habitate with local customs, namely belief. And belief is legalised only when it is enough Indonesianised. Thus the Government's political handling of this enormously diverse Indonesia should depend on the tact of subtle balancing between these dichotomous polarities. But for the particular religions or local traditions which are forced to live under these various dichotomous tendencies, such condition may systematically causes crisis of identity.

Thus Balinese Hindu seems to be torn into four parts, grossly between the reformed soteriological ideology surviving only in interregional area outside Bali such as Kalimantan or Tengger, and persistent local tradition of ritualism which resists further reformation. In case of kebatinan, Some followers may feel that what they learn is the universal message from God, while others find their practice originates from purely Javanese tradition. But both would be quite dissatisfied to find that the legal category of belief to which they belong, is neither universal religion nor particular local culture. It should be something inbetween, namely the Indonesian tradition.

Here lies a basic contradiction of the relation between nationalism, religion, and local cultures. Religion, by the Indonesian definition, should be international, while culture is also by definition local, falling short of being the foundation of national unity. Thus for the ideological device to unify Indonesia, something inbetween is needed, and that is the concept of belief. This is in a sense an ingenious contrivance, a modern myth, to balance between the two polarities of locality and internationality. It is an indigenous idea of Indonesians because it is embedded in local cultures, but not specific to any particular one. Rather it is shared by all cultures, which is supposed to guarantee the basis for the cultural unity of Indonesia. Still, it is more than

just culture because it contains the element of transcendentalism, that is belief in One Supreme God, thus could be claimed that it is after all equivalent with religions.

The problem of this tactful semantic maneuver is the fact that this is such an empty notion. Any attempt to fill this semantic vacuum by infusing particularity in it faces the danger of breaking the balance between locality and internatinality. It is just like a house of belief in Taman Mini Indah Indonesia, a national park of miniatures of Indonesian cultures and religions in Jakarta. Aside from the five religious buildings, there is a building which represents belief, but it is just an empty place for meditation, and no decoration, no particular symbols nor altars.

This emphasis on the emptiness of the notion of belief so far may lead you to think that this is the sign of defeat of Javanese kebatinan vis-a-vis Islam. But it may be not. The particular emptiness of the notion of belief, in fact, may reflect the nature of the Javanese kebatinan itself. One of the widely shared creed of kebatinan is a direct experience of God by each person, and the doctrine is, after all, just a by-product of such personal encounter with God. In this particular sense, the notion of belief in One Supreme God is quite kebatinanlike. You can produce your own doctrine according to your own encounter with God, whatever the term may mean. Thus if you have a place to meditate or to pray, the rest should be done by the practitioners themselves, and in this sense, the doctrinal emptiness of belief originates from kebatinan itself, and as long as the notion of belief is sustained by the Government, kebatinan followers might survive somehow, though not as aggressively as the Hindu Council .

Concluding remarks.

In a sense, what I have attempted to describe here is the political aspect of the process of canonisation of popular knowledge and its reflective impact on popular knowledge itself. Unlike the established religious text as Tri-Pitaka or Al-Qur'an, neither the ordinary Balinese nor the Javanist Javanese did not possess any kind of established canons or systematised doctrines, except for the limited number of esoteric Kawi texts for the high priests in Bali and miscallaneous and scattered holy writings for mushrooming sects in Java. The drive for the canonisation resulted from the interference of a number of waves of different origins, such as the neurotic emphasis of Pancasila for the guideline of the every aspect of daily life and the subsequent emphasis of the religious identity, the dominance of Islam in the Ministry of Religion, and constant pressure from the radical Muslims towards other religious groups. But the prerequisite for the canonisation is the official authorisation of the creed as one of the national religions, and in this light, the Balinese Hinduism, the Javanese kebatinan, and other minority religious systems have traced quite different paths. The success of the canonisation of the Balinese Hinduism has its drawback, namely its failure to replace the popular knowledge with more rigorously systematised textual Hinduism, intended by Parisada imitating reformist Muslims in Java. Contrastively, the Dayaks, some part of the Torajas, and the Tengerese, are forced to officially accept Hindu identity, as a result of their own failure to have their belief system authorised as independent religions. Consequently, the disguised dichotomy of religion and custom, smuggled from reformist Islam to the Hindu Council, legitimises the effort of the doctrinistic Hindu teachers to abolish the local custom totally under the pretext of purifying their faith and introducing the civilised manner.

The Javanists have sought for a legal loophole and their implicit but undeniable control of the central Government allowed them to venture to establish their own legal status of kebatinan. But the intended canonisation has been confronted with a number of obstacles not so easy to hurdle. The legal concept of belief has latent function to give local knowledge a chance to survive the constant pressure from the official religions such as Islam and Parisada Hinduism, but this possibility could be denied by the drive to establish the standardised popular knowledge for all the Indonesians under the banner of Pancasila, and especially of belief in One God. The Javanese kebatinan, which itself is an living encyclopedia of the Javanese popular knowledge, therefore occupies a very intriguing position in the Indonesian cultural politics : on the one hand, its existence as kepercayaan is a symbol of the legal autonomy of popular knowledge (or custom) vis-a-vis the textual knowledge exemplified with the official religions such as doctrinal Islam; on the other

hand, there has been a constant internal dissension between theosophical or aristocratic high-brows who tend to emphasise the self-discipline, meditative attainment, and their kinship with classical philosophy of life fostered within the tradition of the royal palace, and spirit cult followers who are widely supported by the populace but generally played down by the more sophisticated kebatinan followers. This means that the line of division between popular and textual knowledge can be politically drawn either between official religion vs. local custom (or culture) or between high-brow meditators and the followers of spirit cult within the definition of custom itself.

This political manipulatability of division between standard canonical knowledge and peripheral popular knowledge has given rise to a number of confusion. For instance, the idea that the legal status of belief as custom is guaranteed with reference to the first item of Pancasila, i.e., belief in One Supreme God, may possibly subvert the very foundation of the idea of spirit possession itself, which is clearly seen in the cases like TSJ. For any system of local popular knowledge, therefore, the most desirable scenario is not only that its identity as part of kepercayaan legally protect them from the pressure of proselytising canonical religions, but also that it can avoid any excessive standardisation as part of the invented Indonesian tradition modelled heavily on Pancasila and high-brow Javanists' meditative ideology. In this sense, the unsuccessful attempt to crystallise the definition of belief, hence the failure to canonise the standard doctrine proper to Indonesia, may eventually be the best politics of culture for the local popular knowledge, as far as the macro-politics is concerned.

## NOTES

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1. As for the critical assessment of Foucault's notion of power, see Hoy(1986), Said(1986), Minson(1986), Wickham(1986). Poulantzas, a well-known neo-Marxist theorist, while admitting the partial advantage of his microscopic analysis of power, criticises him as underestimating the role of the state with its repressive apparatuses based on physical violence(Poulantzas 1980, p.77). Smart, summarising Poulantzas's position, writes as follows: '... Poulantzas has suggested that not only Foucault underestimated the significance of social class and class struggle but in addition he has neglected the importance of the state at the very time when its expansion and weight are "assuming proportions never seen before"'(Smart 1983, p.105). Lemert and Gillan make the similar point: 'His view of the State is too partial, too overwhelmed by the general mechanism of power-knowledge. But the idea of power-knowledge, precisely because it is general, does suggest a sociology of State power that would operate in the theoretical space'(Lemert & Gillan 1982, p.116). Poulantzas also points out that the Foucauldian image of omnipresence of power may eventually invalidate any resistance to it suggested by Foucault himself(Poulantzas 1980, p.79, p.149; cf. Wickham 1986, pp.163-165).
2. As regards the controversy on Pancasila, see Boneff et al(1980), Darmaputera(1988).
3. General historical account of reformist Islam movement in Indonesia can be found in Noer(1973). As regards Muhammadiyah, the leading reformist group, see Alfian(1969), Nakamura(1976).
4. Geertz argues that these changes are a process of rationalisation from the ritual-centered religious practices to a more systematised, rationalised religion, and calls the whole process "internal conversion"(Geertz 1973).
5. Boon emphasises the importance of the Pasek movement. 'Pasek is a Balinese term for groups with traditional rights to local administrative offices'(Boon 1977, p.171). Boon points out that there are two movements in relation with the Pasek groups: one is to reintegrate the locally scattered members of them; the other is for the non-Pasek people to make themselves part of Pasek to acquire the local administrative office. For the latter purpose, the best thing to do is to make contact with the ancestral temples

which belong to Pasek groups, and to attend the ritual there. As a result of such manoeuvre, there emerged complicated networks of relations around these ancestral temples, which Parisada once tried to clear up (Boon 1977, pp. 171-185; 1979).

6 A slightly more detailed historical account up to 1957 is as follows. Under growing pressure from the neighbouring Banjarese Muslims, the Dayaks tried to establish the Dayak Alliance, which was tacitly supported by the Dutch authorities. After Indonesian Independence, the new Government would not accept a claim for the establishment in the administrative division for the Dayaks, and they were forced to stay within the Province of South Kalimantan which is dominated by the Banjarese Muslims (Miles 1976, pp. 106-115). The antagonism between them was further escalated when the so-called Darul-Islam (house of Islam) movement erupted in various part of Indonesia and began to resist the Javanese-dominated central government to establish an Islamic state (Van Dijk 1987). In 1957 military clashes erupted between the Dayaks and the Banjarese, which eventually lead to the establishment of the Province of Central Kalimantan.

7 This does not mean, however, that the indigenous religious systems of all the Dayaks have been recognized as part of Kaharingan. Meratus Dayaks, located in the Banjarese-dominated South Kalimantan, separated from the mainstream kaharingan center of the Province of Central Kalimantan, failed to acquire official recognition of their creed as an distinct religion, despite of their insistence that theirs is a religion named 'Balian' (Tsing 1987, pp. 201-202; cf. Tsing 1984).

8 Yamashita observes that the official recognition of the Toraja's traditional belief system called Aluk To Doro as a part of Hinduism was prompted by Suharto Government's intention to diminish the influence of the dominant Christian party (Yamashita 1988, pp. 276-277). In addition, Yamashita and Volkman both point out that the tourist policy to promote Toraja as another Bali has accelerated the interaction between these two distinctive cultures (Volkman 1985, p. 167; 1990, pp. 93-94; Yamashita 1988, pp. 201-203).

9 What is striking about this case is the actual historical connection between the Tengerese ritual system and that of the Balinese. The Tengerese priests share the kawi prayer with Balinese middle rank priests called *sengguhuh*. Some of the rituals in Tenger have the same names as those in Bali, and they also share a number of ritual paraphernalia (Hefner 1985, pp. 271-272; cf. Hooykaas 1964a, 1964b, 1974).

10 Lyon describes the invented Hindu initiation ritual called *pensudhian*, virtually imitating the Christian baptism, and Hindu religious meetings, far closer to Islamic Friday prayer than to Balinese calendrical ritual cycles (Lyon 1980, p. 213).

11 As regards *kebatinan* at large, see Geertz (1960, chap. 20-21), Mulder (1978), Koentjaraningrat (1985, pp. 398-410), Takahashi (1989). The doctrinal exegesis of four mainstream *kebatinan* sects, Sapta Darma, Subud, Sumarah, and Pangestu, can be seen in Hadjiwiono (1983) and Palty (1986). Sumarah, among them is relatively well studied. See Stange (1980), Howe (1980), Geertz (1960, pp. 243-244). As regards Pangestu, see De Jong (1976). Subud, see Stompel (1974) for the outline and Lyle (1983) for the speeches of Muhammad Subuh, the founder. Sapta Darma has not yet been studied fully, but

- Staf(1967) gives an outline of their doctrine. Fukushima(1988) deals with local kebatinan sects in Pati Regency.
- 12 The subsequent chronological outline of the history of kebatinan politics in the Government during post-Independence era, from BKKI to HPK, is based, except where otherwise stated, on KWI(1973, pp.223-27), Mulder(1978, pp.1-8), Toeloes(n.d.), Takahashi(1989, pp.63-68).
  - 13 The statistics on kebatinan sects, however, is rather unreliable. See Takahashi(1989, p.71), though the table shown there is far from comprehensive or accurate.
  - 14 This is a statement made by the chairman of BKKI, Wongsanegara(KWI 1973, p.181).
  - 15 The former one is called Adari (Agama Djawa Asli Republik Indonesia, The Religion of Indigenous Java of Indonesian Republic) initiated by Mangun Widjojo in Yogyakarta. The latter Agama Islam Sejati (True Islam), founded Suwarso in Cirebon. Fukushima(1991, pp.162-166) takes up six of such radical kebatinan sects, including examples shown above, during the Sukarno era.
  - 16 Following kebatinan sects are some examples of those which were officially banned: Pransuh/Adam Makrifat, due to its alleged collaboration with Indonesian Communist Party (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 1966); Agama Suci(Holy Religion), due to having insulted Islam(El Hafiady 1977, p.56). Agama Sapta Darma was temporary suspended by the Government because they used the term agama(religion) as part of their name(El Hafiady 1977, pp.56-57). By 1971, the banned sects counted 167 groups(El Hafiady 1977, p.144).
  - 17 Hardjanto, mentioned above, was one of the figures responsible for such rapid spread of Hinduism in Java. Lyon, analysing the factors which contributed to the rapid growth of Hinduism among the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) followers in Klaten, central Java, observes as follows:

• • Negative reaction to Muslim pressures and the desire of the PNI to maintain in some way the structural identity of party organization within the rural area of Klaten, both contributed greatly to the early development of Hinduism as a mass movement. Organized PNI opposition to Islam, both on political and religious grounds, was the most important source of motivation in drawing Hinduism the leadership necessary for its organizational development and spread. And, Hinduism was an ideal solution to the political and religious bind in which the PNI found itself, for Hinduism provided a religious alternative to Islam, and Parisada Hindu Dharma provided an alternative organizational basis for anti-Islamic action(Lyon 1977, pp.94-95).

In addition, it also should be taken into account that the general feeling of anxiety about the ambiguity of the legal status of kebatinan at that time prompted considerable number of its latent followers to accept Hindu identity for security reasons.

- 18 The original provision goes as follows: 'Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agamanya dan kepercayaannya itu'.
- 19 Heated debate on the nature of kebatinan/belief are recorded in various newspapers and magazines during that period. Such controversy, however, had

- already initiated before the New Order: El Hafiady compiles the controversy gotten into Kedaulatan Rakyat from 1961 to 1963, and points indicated in the text had already been made by the critics of kebatinan (El Hafiady, 1977, pp.121-156). Rasjidi, one of the prominent conservative Muslim intellectuals, explicitly argues that kebatinan is a degenerate form of Islamic mysticism in his book (Rasjidi 1977; cf. Warsito et al.1973)
- 20 This problem of identity card was virtually thought to be a symbol of hardship that such kebatinan sects were confronted with while I conducted field research in Kudus and Pati during years 1983-1985.
  - 21 Toeloes, one of the prominent leader of a local branch of HPK (Province of central Java).
  - 22 They are devotees of both Sukarno's marhaenism and TSJ mentioned below in the main text.
  - 23 The whole picture of the political antagonism in Kudus and Pati around 1983-85 was, however, far more entangled than sketched in the main text, which will be analysed further in another paper.
  - 24 As regards the detailed account of Sumarah's involvement in HPK politics, see Stange(1980).
  - 25 The contrast between the self-control and trance is an ubiquitous theme among Southeast Asian countries. Tanabe(1991) points out that this dichotomy overlaps with the gender differentiation, namely the self-controlling male monk vs. female spirit medium, while Ackerman(in this volume) vividly shows the doctrinal contradiction between deconstructive Tibetan tantric Buddhism and the experience of trance within the discourse of a newly emerging cult leader in Malaysia. In Java, the equivalent of the Buddhist self-awareness is the ideal of the inner quietness ( tentreming batin) and subsequent acquisition of power, contrasted with spirit possession. Keeler describes widespread malignance towards mediums ( prewangan) among the South-central Javanese(1987:pp112-124), and I suspect that is because the area is most heavily dyed with the semi-official kebatinan doctrine emanating from the royal palace. Some also insist that woman is more prone to be possessed due to their internal weakness, and Keeler develops an argument of gender differentiation in terms of language, potency and status, maintaining that the Javanese women are less constrained by the formality of linguistic etiquette, thus freer to express their emotions, due to their status being dependent on that of men's(Keeler 1990). I have the impression, however, that this contrast is less established in the area I studied, because the spirit mediums I have encountered in Java were all male and explanation was not particularly made as to the gender factor for spirit possession.

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